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ORIGIN EA-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 FA-05 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00  
ICAE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

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0.0.112065GDS 1/15/85 (OAKLEY, ROBERT B.)

PAGS: ORM, PGOV, MY, US, ASEAN, CB, VM

SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT WITH GOM FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: A) STATE 9550; B) KUALA LUMPUR 1197

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. YOU SHOULD IMPRESS UPON RITHAUDDEEN BY WHATEVER MEANS  
YOU DEEM MOST EFFECTIVE THE NECESSITY FOR ASEAN TO STAND  
TOGETHER IN FACE OF WHAT PROMISES TO BE THE MOST SERIOUS  
LONG-TERM THREAT ITS COUNTRIES HAVE FACED COLLECTIVELY AND  
EVEN INDIVIDUALLY. IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT WAY AND  
DIFFERENT TIME-FRAME THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED IN 1975.  
ASEAN IS BEING TESTED. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRENGTH  
OF ITS MEMBERS PLUS THE INCREASING COHESION THEY HAVE

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SHOWN OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS HAVE WON FOR THEM STRONG  
SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE (E.G. JAPAN, U.S. AND FEC) AND PLACED  
THEM ON A FIRMER FOOTING INTERNALLY. THIS STRONGER  
POSITION IS RECOGNIZED BY THE USSR AND SRV WHICH MAY BE  
MORE RELUCTANT TO CHALLENGE THEM OPENLY, BUT WHICH CAN  
NEVERTHELESS MOVE BOLDLY, AS IN CAMBODIA. WHEN AN OPPOR-  
TUNITY EXISTS EVEN AT RISK OF CREATING TENSIONS WITH ASEAN.  
IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ACTIONS BY THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS  
IN BANGKOK AND BY ASEAN REPS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE  
APPLAUDED AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ASEAN POSITION BE  
FOLLOWED UP IN PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH FRIENDLY AND OTHER  
GOVERNMENTS. A FIRM, CONCERTED ASEAN POSITION MADE KNOWN  
IN A TIMELY AND CLEAR FASHION TO OTHER GOVTS HAS MORE OF  
A POSITIVE EFFECT THAN MAY BE APPRECIATED BY INDIVIDUAL  
ASEAN GOVTS.

P  
EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *Fumihiko* DATE *10/4/80*

PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

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THE CAMBODIANS IN VIET-NAM AS A MINORITY IN THE SENSE IN WHICH THAT WORD IS USED IN THE LAW GOVERNING THE STATUS OF MINORITIES. YET THE PROBLEM WITH THE CAMBODIANS IN SVN CONTINUED TO FESTER AND IT SEEMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE A NUMBER OF STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL TOWARD THEM, TO DEFLECT THEIR PROTESTS, PERHAPS TO SPLIT THE RADICAL MINORITY FROM THE OTHER ELEMENTS, AND TO REMOVE THE PROBLEM BY A NUMBER OF SMALL STEPS WHICH NEED NOT INVOLVE ANY SWEEPING REVISION OF OVERALL POLICY.

3. FOR INSTANCE, I SAID, THE GVN COULD APPOINT A NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS, REPLACING THE PRESENT INCUMBENT, COLONEL KIM KHANH, WITH A MAN MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CAMBODIANS. IT COULD ENCOURAGE THE DIRECTORATE TO PRODUCE SOME PROPOSALS FOR ACTION TO MEET IN SOME MEASURE THE GRIEVANCES OF THESE VIETNAMESE CITIZENS OF CAMBODIAN DESCENT, IT COULD CONVOKE A CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF KHMER REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THIEU'S OWN ADVISERS TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC ISSUES AND HOW TO RESOLVE THEM, AND IT COULD SUSTAIN THE MORE MODERATE AND MORE NUMEROUS DANH BAO FACTION IN THAT WAY. IT COULD STRESS DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF EDUCATION OF PROMISING KHMER STUDENTS, THEREBY DEVELOPING RESPONSIBLE LEADERS FOR THIS IMPORTANT COMMUNITY. FINALLY, THIEU COULD APPOINT A CAMBODIAN-SPEAKING MILITARY OFFICER TO HIS OWN STAFF AS ADVISER ON KHMER MINORITY AFFAIRS AND TO WORK FOR MORE HARMONY IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THAT MINORITY.

4. THIEU WAS NOT UNSYMPATHETIC TO THESE REMARKS BUT I FEEL THAT NO MORE THAN A SEED HAS BEEN PLANTED IN HIS MIND. HE BORE DOWN AT FIRST ON THE "SMALL NUMBER OF AMBITIOUS MEN" ENGAGED IN AGITATING THE CAMBODIAN MINORITY AND VENTED THE SUSPICION THAT SIHANOUK AND/OR THE KKK (CAMBODIAN IRREDENTISTS) MIGHT HAVE A HAND IN STIRRING THEM UP. HE MADE THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENT THAT IF HE GAVE "PRIVILEGES" TO THE CAMBODIANS, HE WOULD HAVE TO DO THE SAME OR MORE FOR OTHER MINORITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND HE FELT THE SITUATION HAD IMPROVED NOW THAT THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT WAS IN CHARGE IN CAMBODIA AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DO SOMETHING PARTICULARLY IF THE CAMBODIANS OF VIET-NAM BECOME LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INFLUENCE BY SIHANOUK PROPAGANDA.

5. I GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THIEU IS BEGINNING TO PERCEIVE, ALTHOUGH ONLY DIMLY AS YET, THE ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO

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HIM BOTH INTERNALLY AND IN HIS RELATIONS WITH A TRULY NEUTRAL  
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IF HE REVISED SOME OF HIS THINKING ABOUT  
THE CAMBODIAN MINORITY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.  
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THE SERVICES OF SOME PEOPLE WHOSE WORK IS LESS ESSENTIAL  
IN CARRYING OUT OUR PROGRAMS HERE. AND SOME OF THE PEOPLE  
IN THE NON-OFFICIAL CATEGORIES FOR WHICH WE ARE RESPONSIBLE  
HAVE ASKED IF THEY COULD LEAVE, ALSO TEMPORARILY IN MOST CASES,  
AND WE WILL FACILITATE THEIR DEPARTURE OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS  
BY MEANS OF THE AIRCRAFT WE HAVE AT OUR DISPOSAL. I CAN'T GIVE  
YOU ANY EXACT FIGURES AT THIS TIME BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW HOW  
MANY WILL BE GOING TO BANGKOK, BUT I WISH TO STRESS THAT THE  
VAST BULK OF OUR OFFICIAL MISSION PERSONNEL ARE REMAINING IN  
PHNOM PENH AND WILL BE CONTINUING THEIR WORK IN SUPPORT OF  
OUR PROGRAMS OF ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER  
REPUBLIC. END QUOTE.  
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